Speech by Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the launch of Professor Jayakumar’s book “Creating Three Unique Singapore Laws” on 12 August 2026. The Mandarin translation is provided courtesy of Lianhe Zaobao.

Please see below for the Mandarin translation of the English speech.

Professor JayakumarColleagues and former colleaguesLadies and Gentlemen

I am very happy to be here today to launch Professor Jayakumar’s latest book – “Creating Three Unique Singapore Laws”.

This book is about how our Constitution was amended to establish three very important institutions in our Singapore system. But it also sheds light on Singapore’s broader approach towards the Constitution.

Independent Singapore did not start out with a new Constitution specifically designed for us. This is quite unlike some other countries. For example, India and the United States convened delegates to design their constitutional architecture from the ground up − brand-new, and comprehensive. They wanted to startde novo– to set out what, in their minds, was the ideal way their nation should function. After intense debate and drafting, they adopted the final texts in their entirety, confident that the ideals, principles and rules therein would stand the test of time, to be abided by for generations to come.

In our case, the suddenness of Separation afforded us no such luxury. We had to cobble together a patchwork Constitution in a hurry. But over the years, we shaped this improvised document to suit our needs, and updated it as circumstances changed and society progressed.

In 1970, after dealing with the most pressing survival needs of the new nation, Mr Lee requested British legal experts to prepare a clean and comprehensive redraft of our patchwork Constitution. I remember that around this time Mr Lee was asking about the US Constitution, and how few amendments it had had over nearly two centuries. In fact, it had only had 25 successful amendments. I thought then that perhaps he was hoping the experts would produce a similarly timeless constitution for Singapore – one that would not need to be amended except extremely rarely. The experts duly produced an elegant draft, but Mr Lee decided that it would not work in practice. The foreign experts lacked an intimate understanding of Singapore’s society and ground realities. They relied too heavily on abstract theory and first-principles academic postulation. Elegant as their draft was, he judged it ill-suited to our local context.

For example, the foreign experts had no idea why our Constitution required an MP who leaves his party to lose his seat. This was contrary to British practice, which allowed MPs to change parties and cross the floor without penalty. The foreign experts thought our provision was unusual, and said “refer back to British practice”. But our Constitution contained this provision for a specific and important reason. In 1961, the pro-Communists in the PAP had split from the party to form the Barisan Sosialis. The 13 legislative assemblymen who had tried but failed to topple the government were expelled from the PAP. But because this provision did not yet exist, they remained in the legislative assembly − now in the opposition − even though they had originally been elected on a totally different platform, under a party that they now bitterly opposed. This was not how representative democracy was meant to work. It led to two years of intense political strife, and Singapore paid an awful price. Mr Lee never forgot this indelible lesson. It caused him to insert the provision later, as soon as he was able to.

Mr Lee therefore decided to keep the existing Constitution. For all its untidiness, it had already been run-in and tested. The public had gotten used to how it operated. This working Constitution could be updated, modified, and adapted as we went along, as and when changes became necessary. Mr Lee eloquently explained his view to Parliament in 1984:

“From my experience, Constitutions have to be custom-made, tailored to suit the peculiarities of the person wearing the suit. Perhaps... like shoes, the older they are, the better they fit. Stretch them, soften them, resole them, repair them. They are always better than a brand new pair of shoes.”

Jaya’s book describes vividly what this meant in practice. It tells the inside story of how we amended our Constitution to create three important political institutions: The Elected Presidency (EP); Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), and Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NCMPs).

These three institutions are unique to Singapore. They are specifically adapted to our context and circumstances – and quite unlike any other constitution in the world. All three institutions were originally conceived by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, and all at around the same time.

Each had a clear purpose, which made sense for our context. The Elected President was to protect the reserves, which we had painstakingly accumulated over many years, from being squandered by an irresponsible government. It was also to safeguard the integrity of the Public Service through independent oversight over key public service appointments and processes. The GRCs were to ensure that Parliament would always have adequate representation of the minority races. The NCMPs were to ensure opposition voices were never shut out of Parliament, and to provide an outlet for the growing desire to have such voices in Parliament.

Each institution had to be carefully designed. After Mr Lee first mooted the ideas with his colleagues, they discussed extensively how exactly each should work. There were many disagreements; many possible models were suggested and discarded. These deliberations surfaced new and complex considerations, which had to be carefully examined, and where relevant, taken into the design. From conceptual idea to implemented scheme, the team revised their thinking quite significantly.

For example, Mr Lee had initially proposed vesting the Elected President with extensive executive powers, which could be used to check and overrule the Government of the day. He called this a “wicket-keeper” role, though it would have been a very powerful wicket-keeper. Some of the younger Ministers, including Dr Tony Tan and Mr Goh Chok Tong, worried that over-concentrating power in a single person could lead to political impasse and abuse of power. After intense arguments, it was eventually decided that the Elected President should have no executive powers at all, only custodial powers, which means the power to say no to government proposals, and even then only in specified key areas where checks and balances were particularly important.

When we finally amended the Constitution to institute the three schemes (in 1984 for the NCMPs, in 1988 for the GRCs and in 1991 for the Elected Presidency), their designs had been significantly altered from Mr Lee’s original conceptions.

And even after the schemes were implemented, we continued to evolve them in the light of experience.

So in their present form, each of these institutions is the end result of more than three decades of accumulated refinements and revisions. To extend Mr Lee’s vivid metaphor, these innovations are no longer recent alterations to our old shoes, but have themselves been stretched, softened, smoothed, and re-patched, to become essential parts of the whole.

This journey underscores a few key points.

Firstly, creating a constitution and laws that meet the specific needs and circumstances of the country is never a purely legal process. It demands a keen understanding of our society – its vulnerabilities, the likely problems, and the solutions to these problems that have the best chance of working. This requires political experience and judgment.

The men who created these three institutions were not scholars or philosophers. They were practical men − men who governed Singapore, and had spent decades creating this improbable nation, and making it work. They were acutely conscious of what made Singapore tick, where our faultlines were, and how very easily things could go wrong. They were not chasing ideological purity or conceptual tidiness, but what worked, and would benefit Singapore. They relied on their creativity and judgment to conceive and design institutions which were uniquely suited to our context, and which remedied real weaknesses in our political system.

Secondly, these constitutional innovations cannot be divorced from their contemporary political context, nor from the larger changes in Singapore’s demographics. For example, two decades after independence, a major demographic shift was underway. The pioneer generation that had run budget surpluses and built up our reserves was fading away. The next generation that would inherit the nest egg had not lived through the existential crises of the founding years. That motivated the search for ways to prevent a profligate government from squandering these reserves. And hence, the Elected Presidency. In the 1984 general election, some candidates used blatant racial appeals to win votes. That gave renewed urgency to ensuring multi-racial representation in Parliament. Mr Lee, as Jaya recounted just now, had been contemplating this problem since the 1970s. And GRCs were the solution to this enduring vulnerability. In the Anson by-election in 1981, an opposition candidate – Mr J. B. Jeyaretnam – won a parliamentary seat for the first time since independence. That cemented Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s conviction that we needed to create an outlet for a younger generation’s desire for opposition voices in Parliament. And having watched how Mr Jeyaretnam’s presence had sharpened Parliamentary debates, Mr Lee also concluded that having opposition MPs in Parliament would keep ruling party MPs on their toes. That led to the NCMP scheme.

Thirdly, however, in creating these institutions, Mr Lee and the younger ministers looked beyond the immediate circumstances. Their predominant concern was not the present, but the future. They sought to build a constitutional framework that would last – one they knew the younger ministers would have to operate; one that would bind future Governments, whether formed by the PAP or other parties.Â

The true test of these three institutions was how they would work out in practice over the years and decades, and across successive governments. Having introduced these major constitutional changes, Mr Lee Kuan Yew and the 2G ministers faithfully subjected themselves to what they had created. Looking back now after nearly half a century, we can safely say that these three institutions have indeed served Singapore well.

Firstly, the Elected Presidency. Since its inception in 1991, successive governments and Elected Presidents have worked together to operate this system of checks and balances. We have continued to refine its detailed workings through periodic Constitutional amendments. But the core concept – that each elected government should spend within its means, and only draw on past reserves with the consent of the Elected President – remains unchanged. The second key mechanism has worked as intended. In normal times, political parties advocating more generous social spending have been forced to explain how they will fund their schemes, or to make the case for changing the rules to spend more from the reserves. In emergencies like the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, the government of the day has been able, with the approval of the Elected President, to draw on our past reserves to fund substantial emergency packages. This signified both the gravity of the situation, and the Government’s capacity to do whatever it takes to tackle the crisis, backed by the substantial reserves that we have built up. The Elected Presidency has fostered more prudent and sustainable attitudes towards state spending amongst all political parties, and the public too.

But the Elected Presidency is not a panacea. To effectively wield the second key, the Elected President must be equal to the heavy task, and must be convicted that that is his proper role and responsibility. But he also has to win popular support, in order to get elected in the first place. And as experience has shown us, it is not a given that voters in a Presidential Election will judge candidates solely on who is best qualified for the task, or who is most committed to fulfilling his custodial role. In an election, especially one decided by a nationwide popular vote, many other factors and considerations can influence the outcome.

Unfortunately, no mechanism, no matter how carefully designed, can give absolute assurance that only persons who are fit for the responsibilities stand for office, or are elected by voters, even for the highest office in the land. Therefore, Singaporeans not only need to understand the great harm that a rogue government can do to the country; they must also be very careful not to elect Presidents who will exceed their roles and responsi­bilities, and cause the system to malfunction. But on the whole, Singapore’s political system and long-term stability are much better served with the check and balance afforded by an Elected President than without.

Secondly, GRCs. Since the scheme’s inception in 1988, we have gradually increased the proportion of MPs elected from GRCs, while maintaining a proportion of Single-Member Constituencies (SMCs). Today, GRCs account for the majority of MPs in Parliament. It is no longer seriously doubted that GRCs have been necessary to ensure that minority races are always adequately represented in Parliament. Nor is there any question that the minority member of a GRC team enjoys the same mandate and political standing as his teammates. Importantly, the GRC scheme has also discouraged race-based politics. Parties that make overt racial appeals to one group risk losing support from other groups, as experience has shown. The GRC scheme has therefore contributed significantly to protecting and fostering multi-racial politics in Singapore.

Thirdly, the NCMP scheme. When first conceptualised, the primary motivation for having NCMPs was to prevent opposition voices from being completely shut out from Parliament. In that era, it was quite possible for the winning party to make a clean sweep at general elections. Four decades on, this is no longer a plausible scenario. Opposition MPs are routinely elected in general elections. But at the same time, the public’s expectations for more alternative voices in Parliament have also gone up. And the Government too, has found it useful for more alternative voices to be represented in Parliament, and to engage them in robust and open political debate. Over the years, we have gradually increased the minimum number of opposition members guaranteed by the NCMP scheme. From 3 in 1984, to 12 today – more than 10% of the total number of MPs in the house, and more than the 10 opposition MPs who were directly elected from constituencies in the 2025 general election. Hence there are currently two NCMPs topping up the opposition presence in Parliament. Opposition parties continue to claim to reject the NCMP scheme, but in reality after the 1984 general election they have never turned down any offer of an NCMP post. On the contrary, they have made full use of the NCMP scheme to raise the public profiles of narrowly-losing candidates, in the hope of improving their chances of winning outright in the next election, as has happened more than once. But this is par for the course.

In evaluating these three institutions, our overriding concern must always be, what is in Singapore’s long-term interests, and what will maintain a stable, well-functioning political system in Singapore. And from that point of view, I am happy that all three have worked out well in practice. The institutions that Mr Lee and his team created have stood the test of time.

I am very glad that Jaya has written this book, telling the inside story of these three institutions. He has been working on it for quite a while. He started more than 15 years ago, in 2011, when I was still PM, but had to put it aside due to other commitments. I am glad he resumed the work last year, with my encouragement, and has now completed the book. In hindsight, the hiatus was a good thing. The extra decade and a half afforded him a longer horizon – to study how the institutions worked, and to look back at their creation with more detachment and perspective.

Jaya’s vantage point on these events is unique. He was a key team member throughout the process of creating these laws. A professor of law before entering politics, his involvement and contributions went far beyond the legal aspects. He contributed considerably on the policy and political parts too – actively engaging in the detailed design, debating the pros and cons of different options. He had a deep institutional understanding of the workings of our Government and the political context. He came up with alternatives, analysed different possibilities objectively, and suggested many improvements. When opinions diverged, he patiently compared the conflicting viewpoints, reconciled them if possible, and proposed possible ways forward. Indeed, he was the key person keeping track of all the different strands, weaving them together and advancing the projects.

I was not yet in politics when the three laws were first conceived in 1981. I first learnt about the Elected Presidency idea listening to Mr Lee at the National Day Rally in 1984. But after I was elected, I became quite involved in the project. I worked closely with Jaya, especially in drafting the two White Papers and the legislation. I therefore took special pleasure in reading Jaya’s successive drafts of the book, and seeing it take shape.

This book is an important contribution to the legal and Constitutional history of Singapore. It is written by a professor of law, but it does not read like a legal tome. It tells the story plainly, in straightforward, accessible language. It brings alive the problems the team was trying to solve, and the trade-offs, intricacies and complications they had to consider. It sheds light on how the leadership team worked behind closed doors, how open they were to radical, out-of-the-box ideas, how intensely but objectively they argued with one another, how Mr Lee Kuan Yew, as Prime Minister, put forth his views robustly, yet repeatedly and indeed obsessively sought alternative perspectives. He was always willing to be persuaded to change his mind, and sometimes settled on a conclusion only after years of reflection and debate. It shows what it means for the Prime Minister to beprimus inter pares(first among equals)in the Cabinet, and how Cabinet collective responsibility is meant to work.

In all these respects, Jaya’s book gives an authoritative yet accessible account of how Mr Lee’s team carried through the creation of these three institutions, and strengthened Singapore’s political system.

I thank Jaya for investing the time and effort to document the journey in this book, which I am distinctly honoured to launch today. May the stories, considerations and insights it contains benefit all its readers – lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Thank you very much and thank you Jaya.

我很高兴今天能在这里为贾古玛教授的新书《立法三章：新加坡修宪的幕后故事》（Creating Three Unique Singapore Laws — An Inside Story）主持发布会。

本书探讨我国宪法如何通过修正，在新加坡体制中确立三个至关重要的制度。同时，它也阐明新加坡对待宪法的更宏观方针。

新加坡独立之初，并没有一部专门为我们量身定制的全新宪法。这与其他一些国家截然不同。例如，印度和美国曾召集代表，从零开始构筑它们的宪法架构——那是全新且全面的。他们希望一切从头开始，勾勒出他们心目中国家运作的理想蓝图。经过激烈的辩论与起草，他们全盘采纳最终文本，并深信其中的理想、原则和规则经得起时间的考验，能让子孙后代恪守不渝。

就我国而言，新马分家来得突然，我们无暇享有这种奢侈。我们不得不在仓促间拼凑出一部宪法。但多年来，我们根据自身需求，对这份应急之作进行修正，并随着环境的变迁和社会的进步不断加以更新。

1970年，在解决了这个新生国家最迫切的生存需求后，李光耀先生邀请英国法律专家，为我们这部拼凑而成的宪法重新起草一份清晰、全面的文本。我记得当时李先生曾询问过美国宪法的情况，以及在近两百年的历史中，它的修正次数何其之少。事实上，美国宪法仅有25次成功的修正。当时我心想，也许他希望专家也能为新加坡制定一部同样能历久弥新的宪法——一部除了极度罕见的情况外，几乎不须要修改的宪法。专家随后确实交出一份优美的草案，但李先生认定它在实际操作中行不通。这些外国专家对新加坡的社会状况和实际国情缺乏深刻了解，过于依赖抽象的理论和基于第一性原理出发的学术推演。草案纵然辞藻华丽，但他判定这并不符合我国的国情。

例如，外国专家无法理解为什么我国宪法规定，脱离所属政党的国会议员必须丧失议席。这与英国的做法相悖，英国允许议员转换阵营、跨党派而不受惩罚。外国专家认为我国的这项规定非比寻常，并建议“参考英国惯例”。然而，我国宪法包含这项规定，有着具体且重要的原因。1961年，人民行动党内的亲共分子分裂出去，成立社会主义阵线（社阵）。这13名企图推翻政府未果的立法议员被开除出党。但由于当时还没有这项宪法规定，他们依然留在立法议会中——此时已成为反对党——尽管他们最初是代表一个完全不同的政纲，在一个他们现在强烈反对的政党旗帜下当选的。代议制民主不该是这样运作的。这导致长达两年的激烈政治冲突，新加坡为此付出惨痛代价。李先生对这不可磨灭的教训铭记于心，这也促使他一有能力时，第一时间将此规定写入宪法。

因此，李先生决定保留现有的宪法。尽管它显得杂乱无章，但已经过磨合与考验，公众也已习惯它的运作方式。这部行之有效的宪法可以随着我们一路前行，在必要时进行更新、修改和调整。李先生在1984年向国会生动地阐述他的观点：

“根据我的经验，宪法必须量身定制，以切合穿衣者的特质。也许……就像鞋子一样，越旧越合脚。把它撑大一点、软化一点、换个鞋底、修补一下，总比一双崭新的鞋子来得好。”

贾古玛的书生动地描绘这在实际操作中的意义。它讲述我们如何通过修宪来建立三个重要政治制度的内幕：民选总统制度、集选区制度以及非选区议员制度。

这三项制度乃新加坡独有。它们是专门为适应我们的国情和情况而设计的，与世界上任何其他国家的宪法截然不同。这三项制度最初都是由李先生构思的，而且几乎是在同一时期提出。

每一项制度都有明确的目的，符合我们的国情。民选总统旨在保护我们多年来煞费苦心积累的储备金，防止它被不负责任的政府挥霍；同时通过对关键公共服务任命和流程的独立监督，维护公共服务的廉洁。集选区制度旨在确保国会中始终有少数种族的充分代表。非选区议员制度旨在确保反对党的声音绝不会被拒于国会之外，并为民众日益增长的、希望国会中出现这类声音的诉求提供一个出口。

每一项制度都经过精心的设计。李先生在向同僚首次提出这些想法后，他们对每项制度的具体运作方式进行广泛讨论。其间存在许多分歧；许多可能的模式被提出，随后又被摒弃。这些审议浮现出许多复杂的新考量，团队必须对它们进行仔细审查，并在相关之处融入设计之中。从概念构想到计划的落实，团队的思想经历相当大的转变。

例如，李先生最初提议赋予民选总统广泛的行政权力，以制衡和否决当届政府。他称之为“守门员”角色，尽管这将是一位权力极大的守门员。包括陈庆炎博士和吴作栋先生在内的一些年轻部长担心，将权力过度集中于一人，可能导致政治僵局和滥权。经过激烈的争论，最终决定民选总统不应拥有任何行政权力，而仅拥有监护权，即对政府提案说“不”的权力，而且仅限于在制衡尤为重要的特定关键领域。

当我们最终通过修宪落实这三项计划（1984年的非选区议员制度、1988年的集选区制度、1991年的民选总统制度）时，它们的设计与李先生最初的构想相比，已经发生重大改变。

即使在这些计划实施之后，我们仍根据实际经验不断改进它们。

因此，这些制度如今的形态，是经历30多年不断完善和修订的最终成果。顺着李先生那生动的比喻来说，这些创新不再只是对我们旧鞋的近期修补，而是经过撑大、软化、打磨和重新缝补，已然成为整体中不可或缺的组成部分。

这段历程突显几个关键点。

第一，制定符合国家特定需求和国情的宪法及法律，绝非纯粹的法律程序。它要求对我们的社会有敏锐的理解——了解它的脆弱性、潜在的问题，以及最有可能奏效的解决方案。这需要政治经验与判断力。

创立这三项制度的人并非学者或哲学家。他们是务实之人——是治理新加坡，花了数十年时间创造这个不可思议的国家并使它成功运转的人。他们敏锐地意识到新加坡生存的动力、我们的断层线所在，以及局势是多么容易急转直下。他们追求的不是意识形态的纯洁性或概念上的整齐划一，而是行之有效且能造福新加坡的方案。他们凭借自身的创造力和判断力，构思并设计出完全适合我国国情，并能弥补我们政治体制中实际弱点的制度。

第二，这些宪法创新不能脱离当时的政治背景，以及新加坡人口结构的宏观变化。例如，独立20年后，我国正经历一场重大的人口结构转型。那些创造财政盈余并积累下储备金的建国一代正在逐渐老去。即将继承这笔财富的下一代，并未经历过建国初期的生死存亡危机。这激发了想方设法以防止挥霍无度的政府上台后耗尽储备金的动力。民选总统制度于是应运而生。在1984年的大选中，一些候选人公然利用种族诉求来赢取选票。这使得确保国会中具有多元种族代表性显得更为迫切。正如贾古玛刚才所回忆的，李先生自1970年代起就一直在思考这个问题，而集选区制度正是应对这一长期脆弱性的解决方案。在1981年的安顺区补选中，反对党候选人惹耶勒南赢得自独立以来的首个国会议席。这坚定了李先生的信念：我们须要为年轻一代渴望在国会中听到反对党声音的诉求创造一个出口。在观察到惹耶勒南的出现，如何使国会辩论变得更加尖锐后，李先生也得出结论：国会中有反对党议员的存在，能让执政党议员时刻保持警惕。这促成非选区议员制度的出台。

第三，在制定这些制度时，李先生和年轻的部长并非着眼于眼前的局势。他们最关心的不是现在，而是未来。他们致力于建立一个能够持久运作的宪政框架——一个他们知道年轻部长必须去操作的框架；一个能够约束未来政府（无论是行动党还是其他政党执政）的框架。

对这三项制度真正的考验，在于它们在过去几年、几十年，在不同时期的各届政府中，如何在实际中发挥作用。在引入这些重大的宪法修改后，李先生和第二代部长忠实地遵从他们亲手创建的制度。在近半个世纪后的今天回首过去，我们可以笃定地说，这三项制度确实很好地服务新加坡。

第一，民选总统制度。自1991年实施以来，历届政府与民选总统共同运作这一制衡系统。我们通过定期的修宪，不断完善它的具体运作。但核心理念保持不变：每届民选政府必须量入为出，只有在民选总统同意的情况下才能动用国家储备金。“第二把钥匙”这一关键机制已如期发挥作用。在正常时期，主张扩大社会支出的政党被迫说明计划的资金来源，或必须为修改规则以动用更多储备金提出理据。在应对全球金融危机和冠病疫情等紧急情况时，当届政府在民选总统批准下，得以动用储备金提供巨额的紧急援助配套。这标志着局势的严峻性，也彰显政府由于有我们所累积的巨额储备金作为后盾，有能力不惜一切代价应对危机。民选总统制度培养各政党乃至公众对国家支出采取更加审慎和可持续的态度。

但民选总统并非灵丹妙药。要有效地动用第二把钥匙，民选总统必须胜任这项艰巨的任务，并坚信这是他应有的角色和责任。同时，他也得先获得选民支持并当选。正如经验所显示的，在总统选举中，选民未必纯粹根据候选人是否最符合资格，或是否最致力于履行他的监护职责来作出判断。在选举中，尤其是在由全国普选决定的选举中，许多其他因素和考量都会影响结果。

遗憾的是，任何机制，无论设计得多么严密，都无法绝对保证只有胜任的人才会参选，或被选民选上，即使是国家最高职位亦然。因此，新加坡人不仅须要了解流氓政府可能给国家带来的巨大伤害，也必须非常谨慎，不要选出越权并导致系统失灵的总统。但总的来说，有了民选总统的制衡，新加坡的政治体系和长期稳定要比没有这项制度好得多。

第二，集选区制度。自1988年实施以来，我们在维持单选区比例的同时，逐步增加集选区议员的比例。如今，集选区议员占国会多数。集选区制度是确保少数种族在国会中始终有充分代表性的必要手段，这一点已毋庸置疑。集选区内的少数种族议员享有与队友同等的委托和政治地位，这一点也毫无疑问。更重要的是，集选区制度遏制了以种族为基础的政治操作。经验显示，公然向某一群体发出种族诉求的政党，面临着失去其他群体支持的风险。因此，集选区制度在保护和促进新加坡的多元种族政治方面，作出重大贡献。

第三，非选区议员制度。最初构思时，设立非选区议员的主要动机是防止反对党声音被完全拒于国会之外。在那个年代，获胜政党在全国大选中包揽全部议席是极有可能的。四十载过去，这已不再是一个合理的假设。反对党议员在全国大选中当选已成常态。但与此同时，公众对国会中出现更多替代声音的期望也在提高。政府也认识到在国会中拥有更多替代声音，并让他们参与激烈而公开的政治辩论是有益的。多年来，我们逐步增加非选区议员制度所保障的最少反对党席位。从1984年的3名增加到如今的12名——超过国会议员总数的10%，也超过在2025年大选中直接当选的10名反对党议员。因此，目前有两名非选区议员填补国会中反对党的席位。反对党虽然继续声称拒绝非选区议员制度，但实际上自1984年大选以来，他们从未拒绝过任何非选区议员的席位。相反，他们充分利用非选区议员制度，来提高以微差落败候选人的公众形象，期望借此增加他们在来届大选中直接胜出的概率，而且这种情况已不止一次发生。但这是意料之中的事。

在评估这三项制度时，我们的首要考量必须始终是：什么符合新加坡的长远利益，以及什么能够维持新加坡稳定、运作良好的政治体系。从这个角度来看，我很高兴这三项制度在实践中都取得良好的效果。李先生及他的团队创立的制度，经受住了时间的考验。

我非常高兴贾古玛写了这本书，讲述这三项制度的内幕。他为此筹备已久。他在15年多前，即2011年我仍担任总理时就开始这项工作，但由于其他事务缠身而不得不搁置。我很高兴他在去年在我的鼓励下恢复写作，如今完成这部著作。事后看来，这段停顿是件好事。多出的这15年让他拥有了更广阔的视野——得以研究这些制度的运作情况，并以更加超然和客观的视角，去回顾它们的创立过程。

贾古玛对这些事件的观察视角是独一无二的。在制定这些法律的全过程中，他都是核心团队成员。他在从政前是法学教授，但他的参与和贡献远超法律层面。他在政策和政治层面也作出巨大贡献——积极参与细节设计，辩论不同方案的利弊。他对我国政府的运作和政治背景有着深刻的体制内理解。他提出替代方案，客观分析不同的可能性，并提出许多改进建议。当意见出现分歧时，他耐心地权衡各方观点，尽可能地协调分歧，并提出可行的前进方向。可以说，他是理清所有脉络、将它们交织在一起并推进项目的关键人物。

1981年这三项法律初具雏形时，我尚未步入政坛。我是在聆听李先生1984年的国庆群众大会演讲时，才第一次了解到民选总统的构想。但在我当选后，我相当深入地参与这个项目。我与贾古玛密切合作，特别是在起草两份白皮书和相关法案方面。因此，在阅读贾古玛本书的历次草稿，并看着它成型的过程中，我感到格外欣喜。

这本书是对新加坡法律和宪政历史的重要贡献。它虽出自法学教授之手，读起来却不像艰涩的法律大部头。它用平实、直白易懂的语言讲述这个故事。它生动地再现团队试图解决的问题，以及他们必须考量的权衡、复杂性与棘手之处。它揭示领导团队在闭门会议中的工作状态：他们对激进、打破常规的想法有多么开放；他们相互之间的辩论是多么激烈却又客观；李先生作为总理，如何强有力地表达自己的观点，却又反复甚至执拗地寻求不同的视角。他总是愿意被说服去改变主意，有时甚至是在经过数年的深思熟虑和辩论后才得出结论。这本书展示总理在内阁中作为“同侪之首”的真正含义，以及内阁集体责任制应有的运作方式。

在所有这些方面，贾古玛的书就李先生的团队如何落实这三项制度的创立，并巩固新加坡的政治体系，提供一份具权威性又通俗易懂的记录。

我感谢贾古玛投入时间和精力，在本书中记录下这段历程。今天能为本书主持发布会，我深感荣幸。愿书中的故事、考量与洞见，能让所有读者——无论是法律界还是非法律界人士——皆获裨益。