–The uniqueness of the case lies in the fact that the Court examined, from the perspective of constitutional compliance, a provision allowing advocates to engage in activities on a contractual basis as employees of the legal services of state bodies, state institutions, and organizations, while not providing for similar activities as employees of the legal services of private-sector entities and non-governmental non-profit organizations.

The Decision clarified not only the legal nature of the institution of advocacy but also the content of the right to qualified legal assistance, the principle of equality of forms of ownership, and the concept of public service.

The constitutional proceedings were initiated following an application submitted by the “Force of Justice” Law Bureau. Based on this application, the National Center for Human Rights of the Republic of Uzbekistan submitted an official petition to the Constitutional Court.

At the heart of the case was a question that appeared straightforward at first glance but, in reality, raised complex constitutional and legal issues: Does a legal provision that permits advocates to work as employees of the legal services of state organizations, while remaining silent regarding private organizations, restrict the rights of private-sector entities? In addressing this question, the Constitutional Court first determined the true legal meaning and scope of the provision whose constitutionality was under review.

One of the Constitutional Court’s principal conclusions was that the contested provision merely establishes an exception allowing advocates to engage, on a contractual-legal basis, in activities as employees of the legal services of state organizations. It does not restrict an advocate’s right to provide legal assistance to other individuals or legal entities.

Through a systematic interpretation of Articles 1, 5, 6, and 9¹ of the Law “On Advocacy”, the Court emphasized that advocates are entitled to conclude agreements on the provision of legal assistance with any natural or legal person.

Accordingly, private companies, business entities, and non-governmental non-profit organizations are not deprived of the opportunity to retain advocates and benefit from their professional legal services.

In the Court’s view, the provision whose constitutionality was under consideration does not prevent private entities from entering into legal assistance agreements with advocates. Therefore, it does not limit the right to qualified legal assistance guaranteed by Article 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

One of the central issues in the case concerned the meaning of the constitutional principle of equality of all forms of ownership and the legal protection thereof, as enshrined in Article 65 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The applicant argued that allowing advocates to engage, on a contractual basis, in the legal services of state bodies and organizations, while denying a similar opportunity to private-sector entities, was inconsistent with this constitutional principle.

The Constitutional Court examined this issue in conjunction with the content of the provision whose constitutionality was under review and other provisions of the Law “On Advocacy”. The Court noted that the provision in question does not restrict the right of privately owned legal entities, business entities, or non-governmental non-profit organizations to conclude agreements with advocates for the provision of legal assistance, nor does it deprive them of access to advocates’ professional services.

Recognizing that, in accordance with the legislation, advocates are entitled to provide legal assistance to any natural or legal person, the Court emphasized that the provision whose constitutionality was being determined does not limit private-sector entities’ ability to exercise their rights and protect their legitimate interests.

Accordingly, the Constitutional Court concluded that the provision does not place privately owned entities in a less favorable legal position than state organizations. As a result, the Court found that the provision under review is not contrary to Article 65 of the Constitution, which guarantees the equality of all forms of ownership and their legal protection.

Another important issue addressed during the proceedings concerned the scope of the statutory prohibition on advocates holding public service positions. Under Article 7 of the Law “On Advocacy”, an advocate may not serve in public office. This raised the question of whether engaging in activities as an employee of the legal service of a state organization should be regarded as public service.

The Constitutional Court provided a clear answer to this question.

According to the Court, the provision whose constitutionality was under review does not concern employment relationships based on a labor contract, but rather relationships arising from a civil-law contract. Within such legal relationships, an advocate does not acquire the status of an employee of the organization, is not subject to its internal labor regulations, and retains their independent professional status.

For this reason, such activity cannot be regarded as public service and cannot be viewed as a means of circumventing the statutory prohibition established by law.

This legal position is of particular importance for future legal practice, as it clearly delineates the boundary between public service and the independent provision of legal services by advocates on a contractual basis.

During the consideration of the case, members of the Scientific Advisory Council under the Constitutional Court expressed various views on the constitutional issues involved. In particular, based on an analysis of legal scholarship and comparative international experience, extensive discussions were held regarding the constitutional grounds for different legal regimes applicable to the public and private sectors, the independence of the legal profession, and the substance of the right to qualified legal assistance.

It was also noted that the establishment of legal services within state bodies, bodies of economic administration, state institutions, and organizations is mandated by legislation and is directly linked to the performance of their public-law functions. By contrast, business entities and non-governmental non-profit organizations operate under a different legal framework due to their distinct legal status and operational characteristics, and no such requirement is imposed on them. Accordingly, it was argued that the provision whose constitutionality was under review reflects objective differences in the legal status and functions of public and private entities and, therefore, lacks sufficient grounds to be regarded as inconsistent with Article 65 of the Constitution.

This Decision of the Constitutional Court established several important constitutional and legal positions.

First, the Constitutional Court interpreted the function of the institution of advocacy, as envisaged by Article 141 of the Constitution, as the provision of qualified legal assistance to individuals and legal entities. The Court noted that this constitutional function is carried out through legal assistance agreements concluded by advocates and that the provision whose constitutionality was under review does not hinder the fulfillment of this function.

Second, the right to receive qualified legal assistance, guaranteed by Article 29 of the Constitution, is ensured by the possibility of concluding a legal assistance agreement with an advocate and does not depend on whether the advocate is an employee of a particular organization.

Third, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the provision under review does not restrict the right of privately owned legal entities, business entities, and non-governmental non-profit organizations to enter into legal assistance agreements with advocates and to use their professional services. Consequently, the Court concluded that the provision is not inconsistent with Article 65 of the Constitution, which guarantees the equality of all forms of ownership and their legal protection.

Fourth, activities carried out by an advocate within the legal services of state bodies, bodies of economic administration, state institutions, and organizations on a contractual basis fall within the sphere of civil-law relations rather than employment relations. Therefore, such activities do not constitute public service and do not undermine the advocate’s independent legal status.

Fifth, the Constitutional Court formulated the legal position that the provision in question is not restrictive and does not impede the legal profession’s fulfillment of its constitutional function of providing qualified legal assistance to individuals and legal entities.

In conclusion, this Decision of the Constitutional Court is of considerable importance for clarifying the legal status of the institution of advocacy, the content of the right to qualified legal assistance, and the constitutional meaning of the principle of equality of forms of ownership. In assessing the legal provision at issue, the Court relied on its actual legal substance and its place within the broader legislative framework, applying a systematic rather than merely formal method of constitutional interpretation.